

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 JAKART 02858 01 OF 02 071050Z  
ACTION EA-06

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 SS-14 /021 W  
-----071101Z 053972 /17

R 070638Z MAR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9611  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY RANGOON  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
USLO PEKING  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 JAKARTA 02858

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

LIMDIS

FOR EA ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, US, XB  
SUBJECT: US POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IN POST VIETNAM PERIOD

REF : KUALA LUMPUR 1215

1. SUMMARY: WE TAKE EXCEPTION TO ANALYSIS IN REFTTEL AS FAR  
AS INDONESIA IS CONCERNED. WE HAVE REGIME OF WORRIED,  
BASICALLY INSECURE MEN, WHO DO STILL SEE INTERNAL COMMUNISM  
AS LONG RANGE THREAT AND WHO ARE LOOKING CAREFULLY AT US AS  
THEY ASSESS THEIR CHANCES FOR FUTURE. HOWEVER WE ASSESS  
WHAT OUR POSTURE SHOULD BE TOWARD INDONESIAN REGIME, WE

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CANNOT ASSUME NEEDS WILL BE FULLY MET THROUGH BASICALLY  
BENIGN POLICIES RELATING TRADE AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES.  
FINALLY, WHILE APPRECIATING AMBASSADOR UNDERHILL'S FEELINGS  
ABOUT AID MISSIONS, WE FEEL HE FAILS TO APPRECIATE DEGREE  
TO WHICH NEW DIRECTIONS HAVE HAD IMPACT IN INDONESIA AND  
INEVITABILITY OF MISSION PRESENCE IF WE ARE TO PROVIDE ANY  
AID AT ALL. END SUMMARY.

2. IN SPIRIT CONTINUING POLICY DIALOGUE DESIRED BY NEW EA LEADERSHIP, WE FEEL COMPELLED COMMENT ON AMBASSADOR UNDERHILL'S PROVOCATIVE ANALYSIS.

3. WHATEVER MAY BE SITUATION ELSEWHERE, INDONESIA HAS NEVER CONSIDERED ITSELF CLIENT STATE OF US, NOR HAS IT TOLERATED US PATERNALISM IF WE HAVE EVER SOUGHT TO EXERCISE IT. PRESENT INDONESIAN LEADERSHIP CANNOT BE CHARACTERIZED AS "SUPREMELY CONFIDENT MEN." WHATEVER MAY BE THEIR FACADE OF CONFIDENCE OR INDIFFERENCE ON INTER-NATIONAL SCENE, THEY ARE STILL DEEPLY AFFECTED BY ABORTIVE COMMUNIST COUP IN 1965, STILL FEAR COMMUNISM AS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN INDONESIA, AND ATTACH MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO CONTINUED EQUILIBRIUM AMONG MAJOR POWER ADVERSARIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IMAGE OF MOTHER AT KINDERGARTEN DOORWAY CAN SUITABLY BE APPLIED TO HARD-HEADED, IF TROUBLED, MEN, WHO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH UNITED STATES WILL GIVE THEM TIME TO STRENGTHEN THEIR OWN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THEIR FAILINGS, FACT IS INDONESIA AND THE LOT OF AVERAGE INDONESIAN HAS IMPROVED UNDER THEIR LEADERSHIP.

4. INDONESIAN LEADERS SEE RELATIONSHIP WITH US IN TERMS (1) CONTINUED WILL OF UNITED STATES TO BALANCE SOVIET AND - TO LESSER EXTEND - CHINESE PRESENCE; (2) MILITARY ASSISTANCE; AND (3) US PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AID EFFORT. THESE ARE PARTS OF AN "AMERICAN OPTION" WHICH  
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INDONESIANS HAVE CONSCIOUSLY CHOSEN; IT HAS NOT BEEN IMPOSED UPON THEM. THEY HAVE CHOSEN IT AT COST SOME INTERNAL COMPLAINTS, PARTICULARLY FROM NATIONALISTS.

5. ONE CAN ARGUE THAT, REGARDLESS OF WHAT WE DO, INDONESIAN REGIME HAS FEW OTHER OPTIONS. WHILE THEY MAY NOT EMBRACE OUR ADVERSARIES, THEY CLEARLY HAVE OPTION OF REDUCING OUR DIPLOMATIC ACCESS, LISTENING LESS TO US ON ISSUES LIKE HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ATTACKING US MORE ON MATTERS OF MARGINAL VALUE TO THEM. I HAVE SEEN IN OTHER AREAS SUBTLE CHANGE IN RELATIONSHIP WHICH OCCURS WHEN WE UNILATERALLY DISMANTLE ESSENTIALS OF EARLIER RELATIONSHIP. THIS COULD HAPPEN IN INDONESIA. I BELIEVE IT SHOULD, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, BE AVOIDED.

6. ADMITTEDLY, IT BECAME DIFFICULT TO STATE PRECISELY WHAT ELEMENTS OF OUR SOUTHEAST ASIAN PRESENCE ARE IMPORTANT TO INDONESIANS. THEIR GENERAL SENSITIVITY TO FOREIGN BASES PRECLUDES THEM FROM TAKING USEFUL STAND PUBLICLY OR WITH

PHILIPPINES. NEITHER THEY NOR WE WANT GENERALIZED RHETORIC FROM US OF KIND WHICH IN PAST HAS CAUSED US TROUBLE BOTH WITH CONGRESS AND ABROAD. WHAT WILL IMPACT NEGATIVELY ON INDONESIAN LEADERS ARE ANY ACTIONS WHICH SEEM CLEARLY TO IMPLY THAT WE ARE NOW INDIFFERENT TO FATE OF NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN ASIA. FOR THIS REASON, IF WE WISH TO PRESERVE OUR CURRENT RELATIONSHIP, ANY ADJUSTMENTS WE MAKE IN KOREA, IN RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM, IN PHILIPPINES SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUFFICIENTLY HIGH LEVEL DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS TO EXPLAIN AND REASSURE REGARDING OUR OVERALL INTEREST IN AN EQUILIBRIUM OF FORCES IN SEA.

7. WASHINGTON POLICY MAKERS MUST, OF COURSE, DECIDE WHETHER SUCH REASSURANCES OR SUCH RELATIONSHIP IS IMPORTANT IN OVERALL FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC CONTEXTS. ADMITTEDLY THIS

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ACTION EA-06

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 SS-14 /021 W  
-----071719Z 058537 /44

R 070638Z MAR 77  
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9612  
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AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY RANGOON  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
USLO PEKING  
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

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IS NOT PERFECT REGIME, ALTHOUGH WE FIND AMBASSADOR UNDERHILL'S CHARACTERIZATION OF GENERALS AS UNDULY FACILE. IT IS HARD TO SEE ALTERNATIVE THAT WOULD PROVIDE ANY GREATER

DEGREE OF GENERAL FREEDOM, OF RESPONSIBILITY IN WORLD AFFAIRS, AND OF ACCESS FOR OUR BASIC INTERESTS. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES ARE RIGHTIST MUSLIM REGIME WHICH WOULD SPLIT COUNTRY, MILITANTLY NATIONALIST ORDER, OR RESURGENT COMMUNISM. DEMOCRACY IN OUR SENSE IS NOT ONE OF THEM.

8. AMBASSADOR UNDERHILL TAKES PARTICULAR EXCEPTION TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE WHICH IS, ADMITTEDLY, DIFFICULT PROBLEM. OUR ASSISTANCE HAS ENABLED GOI TO PLACE GREATER EMPHASIS ON  
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (MILITARY DEVELOPMENT BUDGET IS ONLY 3 PERCENT OF TOTAL). PROGRAM HAS GIVEN US LEVERAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION. INDONESIANS HAVE BEEN GENERALLY RESPONSIVE TO OUR LIMITATIONS ON USE OF US ARMS IN TIMOR. I DO NOT BELIEVE SUCH PHRASES AS "INDONESIAN GENERALS ARE AFRAID WE WILL WITHDRAW OUR MONEYBAGS" ARE HELPFUL TO INTELLIGENT DEBATE OVER OUR FUTURE POLICIES. FACT IS THAT INDONESIAN GENERALS WHO WANT PERSONAL PROFIT SHUN US MILITARY PROCUREMENT FOR THAT FROM EUROPE WHICH YIELDS GREATER POSSIBILITIES PERSONAL COMMISSIONS.

9. WE TAKE STRONGEST SUBSTANTIVE EXCEPTION TO SUGGESTION THAT AID MISSIONS ARE UNINFLUENTIAL, ANACHRONISTIC HOLD-OVERS AND SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN. IN INDONESIA, OUR AID EFFORT IS PART OF WHAT OVER YEARS HAS BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IN WHICH WE ARE PARTICIPATING WITH THIRTEEN OTHER COUNTRIES AND IBRD. US EMPHASIS ON HELP TO POORER LEVELS OF POPULATION HAS HAD DISTINCT EFFECT ON GOI AND OTHER DONORS. AID-LED POPULATION PROGRAM HAS HAD DEMONSTRABLE SUCCESS IN HIGHLY IMPORTANT AREA. NEITHER CONGRESS NOR REALITIES OF INDONESIAN SCENE WOULD ENABLE US TO CONTINUE THIS ROLE WITHOUT AID MISSION.

10. WE DO NOT, IN THIS ANALYSIS, EXCLUDE IMPORTANCE, ALSO, OF TRADE AND COMMODITY POLICIES, COOPERATION WITH ASEAN, AND EXCHANGES, BUT, IN INDONESIA, AT LEAST, WE CANNOT IGNORE FACT THAT LEADERSHIP REMAINS CONCERNED BY GEOPOLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS AND WE ARE, INESCAPABLY AN ELEMENT IN THIS QUESTIONS.  
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## Message Attributes

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Margaret P. Grafeld  
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